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Abstract. We develop an incomplete information model of a sequence of 
elections in a one-dimensional policy space, where voters have no con­
temporaneous information about candidate positions, and candidates have no 
information about voter preferences. The only source of information is 
contemporaneous endorsement data and historical data on the policy positions 
of previous winning candidates. We define a notion of "stationary rational 
expectations equilibrium", and show that such an equilibrium results in 
outcomes which are equivalent to those that would occur under full infor­
mation. 
1. Introduction
In this paper, we develop a model of a sequence of elections in a one-dimensional 
issue space, where voters have no contemporaneous information about candidate 
positions, and candidates have no information about voter preferences. The only 
source of information is contemporaneous endorsement data, and historical data 
on the policy positions of previous winning candidates. 
We define a notion of "stationary rational expectations equilibrium" (SREE), 
to describe equilibrium behavior in this model. In an SREE, the candidates are 
assumed to adopt a stationary strategy - i.e., each period's strategy is an 
independent draw from the same distribution. Voters have beliefs of the candidates' 
positions which must be "rational". I.e., since the candidates' strategies are 
stationary, the distribution that voters believe a candidate's position will follow 
must agree with the observed historical distribution of his previous winning 
positions. Each voter follows a voting strategy that maximizes his expected utility, 
given his belief of the candidate positions and the observed endorsement (which tells 
him the left-right orientation of the two candidates). Candidates follow a strategy to 
maximize their utility, given the assumed stationarity of voter behavior. 
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Specifically, they are assumed to adopt strategies which match the distribution of 
previous winning strategies. The unique stable SREE for the corresponding n + 2 
person election game is shown to be the same as the perfect information 
equilibrium, in which both candidates adopt the median voter's ideal point with 
probability one. 
In earlier papers, we develop an alternative model of two-candidate, majority 
rule spatial elections, in which candidates have no information about voter 
preferences, and some voters have no contemporaneous information about 
candidate positions (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1984a, 1985a). In that model, we 
show that access to poll data is sufficient to yield a full information rational 
expectations equilibrium. This paper differs from our earlier work in that it 
concerns a sequence of elections rather than a single election, and the source of 
information is historical data rather than poll data. Further, while our earlier work 
assumes that there are some informed and some uninformed voters, here we assume 
that all voters are uninformed. Nevertheless, the results of both approaches are 
similar: equilibrium behavior in both models is similar to the behavior that would 
result were all voters informed. 
This paper is a companion paper to McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985b), 
providing formal statement and proofs for the results reported in that paper. 
Further motivation and justifications of the assumptions, as well as experimental 
data relating to the model can be found in the companion paper. 
2. The Formal Model
We assume that there are two candidates, designated by K = { 1, 2}, n voters (with n 
odd), designated by N = { o:1, o:2, . • .  , o:n}, and a one-dimensional convex policy 
space, X k JR. Each voter, o:; EN, has a utility function u;: X-+ JR, which is symmetric
and single peaked about an ideal point yt, We let K0 be the three element set 
consisting of the two candidates, plus a third element, "O", which is used to 
represent "no endorsement" or "abstention". Thus, K0 = { 1, 2, O} =Ku {O}. Let F 
be the set of functions from Ko into K0. (Elements of F will be used to represent 
voter strategies.) For any k EK, we use f to denote the opposition candidate. I.e.,
f EK -{ k}. We let fJJ be the set of Borel measurable subsets of X. 
We now define a sequence of identical games, where in each game, the players 
consist of the candidates, K, together with the voters, N. In each game, the strategy 
space for candidate k and voter Cl; are denoted Sk and B;, respectively. We assume 
Sk = X and B; = Ffor all k EK and o:; EN. So candidate strategies are positions on the
issue, while voter strategies are decisions as to who to vote for as a function of which 
candidate is endorsed (see below). We write S = S1 x S2, and B = B1 x . . .  x Bn, and
we denote specific strategy choices of the candidates and voters, respectively, by 
s=(s1,s2)ES and b=(b1, . • .  ,bn)EB. For any s, s'ES and b, b'EB, let (sis£r)) 
denote the strategy n + 2 tuple obtained by replacing the k1h candidate's strategy ip s
by s£, and (s, b lbD denote the strategy n + 2 tuple resulting from replacing the i1h 
voter's strategy, b;, by b[. Given a strategy n + 2 tuple (s, b) ES x B, we now define
the payoff function for the game. 
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First, we define the endorsement to be a function, e: S---+ K, of the candidates' 
positions on the issue. Specifically, ! 1 if S1 <S2 
'· e(s) = 2 if s2 < s1  
0 otherwise 
( 1 )  
Thus e(s) tells the voters which candidate i s  to the left and which is to  the right on the 
election issue. For any specific vector of votes by then voters,p E K0, and for k E K0, 
we write 
and 
if V1(p)>V2(p) 
if V2(p) > V1 (p) 
otherwise . 
(2) 
(3) 
(Here we use the notation IA I to represent the number of elements of a set A.) Then,
for any (s, b) ES x B, the vote for candidate k is given by 
(4) 
The winning candidate, or election outcome is 
w(s, b)=w(b(e(s))) , (5) 
where w(s, b) = 0 means a fair coin is tossed to determine if 1 or 2  wins. We can then 
define the payoff to voter IY.; EN by 
(6) 
where s0 represents the outcome resulting from a tie - namely a fair lottery between 
s1 and s2 - and we assume that the utility a voter associates with a tie is simply u;(s0) 
=tu;(si) + tu;(s2). Finally, the payoff to candidate k EK is 
if w(s, b)=k 
if w(s,b)=K 
otherwise . 
(7) 
These definitions specify the normal form for one stage of the game. This normal 
form corresponds to an extensive form in which the candidates begin with a move in 
which they simultaneously choose policy positions. The voters are informed of the 
endorsement (which tells them which candidate is to the left and which to the right), 
and they then have a simultaneous move in which they vote for the candidate of 
their choice. While they know the endorsement before they vote, and can condition 
their strategy on this information, note that they do not know the candidate 
positions. 
The game we analyze is an infinitely repeated version of the above single stage 
game. We assume that the candidates do not know the voter characteristics - i. e., 
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they do not know the voter ideal points, y?. However, all players observe the 
outcome w(s, b) and the position Sw(s,b)' of winning candidates in previous plays of
the game. 
· 
We now define an equilibrium for this repeated, incomplete information game. 
But first we need some further notation. Let Ak be a set of probability measures on 
Sk. So Ak represents the set of admissible mixed strategies of candidate k for a single 
stage of the game. We will only consider stationary strategies for candidates in the 
repeated game, i. e., we consider only strategies in which candidates adopt the same 
mixed strategy in each stage of the game. We assume throughout that elements of Ak 
are either absolutely continuous (with respect to Lebesgue measure on X), or 
degenerate point masses (i. e., A.k( { x}) = 1 for some x EX). We let A= A1 x A2. So for
A.= (A.1, A.2) EA, A. represents the product measure of A.1 and A.2. 
Given A.= (A.1, A.2) EA, we define several measures on &O. For k EK, j E K0, and
bEB, define 
A.k/-): The distribution of sk given that} is endorsed, (i. e. given e(s)=j) , (8) 
A.kw(-lb): The distribution of sk given that k wins (if k never wins, 
set AkwC-lb)=A.;;(-)) . (9) 
A.wC lb): The distribution of winning positions, i.e., of Sw(s,b) . (10) 
Formally, for any A� S, and kE K, we let nk(A)= {xE Sklx=sk for some sES} 
be the projection of A on coordinate k. For kEK0, we let Ek={sESie(s)=k} be 
the set of strategy pairs where candidate k is endorsed, and for b EB, 
Wk(b) = {s E Slw(s, b) =k} be the set of strategies where candidate k wins. Given A. 
= (A.1, A.2) EA, we define some derived probability measures. For each k EK and
jEK0, define the probability measures A.ki as follows: For CE&O, 
A. ·(C)=A.( -1(C)I£.)= 
A.(n;1(C)nEi) k; nk 
1 A.(Ej) . 
(11) 
So A.ki represents the distribution of k's positions when he is endorsed. We also 
define, for any bEB, the measure A.kw ( · lb) by, for all CE&O, \ A.(n;1(C)n Wk(b))+tA.(n;1(C)n W0(b)) if A.(Wic(b))=l=l
A.kw(Cib)= 
A.(Wk(b))+2A.(Wo(b)) (12) 
A.;;( C) otherwise . 
So A.kw represents the distribution of k's positions when he wins the election -
except if k never wins, then A.kw is defined as the distribution of k's winning positions. 
Note that in defining A.kwC lb), we must take account of the possibility that k wins
outright as well as the probability that k wins the coin toss when there is a tie. Given 
A.EA, and b EB, we let A.w( ·lb) denote the overall distribution of winning positions. 
So for CE&O, " 
Aw(Cib)= L Akw(Cib)[A.(Wk(b))+tA.(Wo(b))] kEK 
=I [A.(n;1(C)n Wk(b))+tA.(n;1(C)n W0(b))] (13) kEK 
1 
J 
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Finally, for any y EA, we define B(y) � B by
B(y) = {b* E Bl\f b EB, ht E arg max E1 [M;(s, b ib;)]} (14)
bjeBi 
Here E1 is the expectation under y. Hence B(y) is the set of optimal voting strategies 
by the voters given beliefs y =(Yi, }'z) of the candidate strategies.
Definition: A Stationary Rational Expectations Equilibrium (SREE) for the game
defined by (6)-(7) is a triple (A.*, y*, b*)EA x A x  B satisfying
(Vl) b*EB(y*) , 
(V2) for all kEK , 
(Cl) for all kEK , 
rt= A.tw( ·lb*) ' 
A.t = A.twC · l b*) . 
In this definition, (Vl) requires that each voter adopt a voting strategy, ht, to 
maximize his expected utility conditional on his belief of the candidate policy 
positions. Condition (V2) requires that voters have "rational expectations", i. e., 
their beliefs about the candidates must be consistent with the observed historical 
positions of that candidate, and (Cl) requires that the candidate distribution must 
equal the distribution of their past winning positions. The rationale here is that if 
this condition fails, then some of the pure strategies adopted under A.k are more 
successful than others, so the candidate strategy cannot be optimal. 
3. Preliminary Lemmas
We establish three lemmas that yield our central results. For the first lemma, we 
need to define the notion of stochastic dominance. For any c E JR, we define 
Lc={tEJRlt�c}. Given two measures A,µ on the Borel sets of JR, we say that A 
(weakly) stochastically dominatesµ, written µ� A iff µ(LJ ;:;;A.(Lc) for all CE JR. We 
say A (strongly) stochastically dominatesµ, writtenµ< A iff µ� A and it is not the case 
that A�µ. Thus, A. weakly stochastically dominates µ whenever its cumulative 
density function is always less than or equal to that ofµ. For strong domination, the 
two c.d.f.'s cannot be equal.
Lemma 1: For each k EK, A.kk < A.k < Aki< whenever all measures are defined, unless 
A.k({t*}) = 1for some t* E JR. Further, for each k EK, A.kk < Ai<k whenever both measures 
are defined. 
Proof: For k EK, and t E JR let Fk(t) = A.k(L1) be the cumulative density function of 
A.k. Then from the definition of Aki' for any CE f!J we have
1 
A.k;;( C) = A.(E;;) I F;;(t)dA.k(t) '
and 
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Now, since Fic(t) is a monotonic increasing function of t and (1 -Fic(t)) is a 
monotonic decreasing function of t, the result that A.kk < A.k < A.kic follows directly 
from Lemma 3.2 of McKelvey and Page (1 984). 
To see that A.kk < Aick> we note that, for c E JR, 
and 
But, writingfj(t) for the density function of A.i, we can integrate by parts to obtain 
c c 
J (1 -Fic(t))dA.k(t) = Fk(c) - J Fic(t) fk(t)dt 
- 00 - 00 
c 
=Fk(c)[1 -Fic(c)] + J fic(t)Fk(t)dt
- 00 
c 
� J Fk(t)dA.ic(t) 
- 00 
Hence 
which proves A.kk < Aick . 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2: If (A.*, b*) EA x B characterizes an SREE, then it satisfies the following 
conditions 
(a) for all ai EN, all j EK and all k E K0 with A. *(Ek)> 0, bt satisfies 
E;.;Jui(x)]=E;.j.[ui(x)]= bt(k)=} , 
(b) w(s,b*) is constant for A.* a.e. sES, 
(c) for each kEK0, if A.*(Ek)>O, then jaiEN for which 
E,ir.[u;(x)] = E,itJu;(x)] . 
Proof: 
(a) Note that w(s, b) depends on sonly through the dependence of b on s. Hence we 
write w(s, b) = w(b(e(s)). Then, by (Vl) in the definition of an SREE, 
btEargmaxE,i.[Mi(s,b)[bt)] for all bEB ,
b{EF 
i _J 
r . h L  . . dl f . Elect10ns wit nrnte n ormat10n 
But 
EA* [M;(s, b lbt)] =EA* [u;(Sw[(bjbt)(e(s))j)] = L J U;(Sw[(bjb,*)(k)]dA *(s) .
kEKo Ek 
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(15) 
,so we maximize (15) by picking bf so that for each k E K0, with A. *(Ek)> 0 ,  then
... 
bf(k)Earg .max J u;(Sw[(bjbt)(klldA.*(s) .b;(k)EKo Ek 
(16) 
But since w is monotonic, and ( 1 6) must hold for all b EB, this is equivalent to, for all 
kEK0, with A.*(Ek)>O 
bf(k)E arg ;nax J u;(sb�(kJ)dA. *(s) , b;(k)EKo Ek 
or 
bf(k)Eargmax J u;(sj)dJi.*(s) 
jE Ko Ek 
But for jEK, 
J u;(sj)dA.*(s)=J u;(x)dA.JHx)=E"Jk[u;(x)] 
Ek 
So the result follows. 
(b) We write w(s,b*)=w(b*(e(s)), and for any kEKo, write wk=w(b*(k)). Also 
we write Ek={sie(s)=k} for kEK0. Thus, sEEk=w(s,b*)=wk. If A.*(Ek)=l for 
any k E K0, then the result follows trivially, so we assume that A. *(Ek)< 1. But 
by the assumptions on A, A.*(E0) = 0 or A. *(E0) = 1, hence we have A. *(E0) = 0 and
0 <A. *(Ek)< 1 for all k EK. We now have two cases: 
Case 1: wk=!=O for any kEK 
Let k EK, and let wk=}. We then show that w;, = j. Suppose not. Then wk= j and
w;,=T Now from (Cl), we have, for all CE?J, 
and 
-1 
A.�(C) 
A.*(n7 (C)nE;;) =A.;i:(Cib*)1 A. *(EiJ 
1k 
By lemma 1, it follows that A.l and A.jare both degenerate point densities, implying
that A.*( { s}) = 1 for some s ES. But this contradicts the fact that A. *(E0) = 0 and
A. *(Ek)> 0 for all k EK. Hence we must have wk= w;;. So, since 
A. *(Ek u E;;) = 1 -A. *(E0) = 1, it follows that w(s, b*) =wk for A.* a.e. s ES. 
Case 2: wk=O for some kEK.
Let wk=O and �t kEK- {k}. We will show that w;;.=0 . Assume w;;=t=O, say w;;
=}EK, and letjEK- {J}. Then from (Cl), we have, for all CE?J, 
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A. * (ni-1 (C) nE;c) +H * (nj-i (C) nEk) 
.A.j(C) = A. * (E;;) +H *(Ek)
.A.* (ni-1(C))-t.A.* (ni-1(C)nEk)
1-H*(Ek) 
2.A.j (C)-.A.* (E).A.Jk(C) 
2 -A. * (Ek)
Solving this for .A.j(C) yields 
.A.j(C)=.A.jt(C) . 
Also applying (C1) we have, for all CE�, 
-1 .A.;i<(C)= 
.A.*(nj (C)nEk) =.A..:t' (C)J ).* (Ek) 
jk 
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By Lemma 1, it follows that A. j and .A.j are both degenerate point densities. As in
Case 1, this yields a contradiction, unless w;; = 0 .  But then w(s, b*) = 0 for A.* a.e. 
SES. 
(c) If A. * (E0) = 1, then the result is trivial, so we assume A. * (E0) = 0. There are two
cases. 
Case 1: w(s, b*) =k =l= 0 for A.* a.e. sE S. In this case, it follows from (Cl) and (12) 
that .A.t = .A.t. Hence .A.f1 = .A.t2 and .A.f2 = .A.!1. From Lemma 2a it follows that if
b;*(1)=l=O, then b['(1)=j=b;*(2)=J So w(b*(1))=k=w(b*(2))=f, a contradiction 
unless b;* (1) = 0 for some 11.; EN. But then, for this i, by Lemma 2a, we have that 
E).ri[u;(x)] =Ext, [u;(x)] . 
A similar argument shows that b;* (2) = 0 for some II.; EN, from which it follows that
E).i'2[u;(x)]=E).12[ui(x)] for some 11.iEN. 
Case 2: w(s,b*)=O for A.* a. e. sES. In this case let kEK satisfy .A.*(Ek)>O, and
assume b;* (k) =l= 0 for all II.; EN. Then since there are an odd number of voters, we 
must have v1(s,b*)=l=v2(s,b*) for any sEEk. But then w(s,b*)=l=O for sEEk> a 
contradiction. So we must have b;*(k)=O for some 11.iEN. But this implies, by
Lemma 2a, that E).;,[u;(x)] = E).idu;(x)] . Q.E.D. 
We let As i;;; A be the set of measures satisfying, for all A.= (.A.1, .A.2) EA,
(a) .A.1 = .A.2
(b) .A.k is symmetric about t* for some t* E JR. I.e., .A.k (Lr) = 1 -.A.k(L21• - r) for all t E JR, 
(where Lc={xEJRlx�c} for any cEJR). 
Lemma 3: Let u: X �JR be symmetric and single peaked, with ideal point at 0, and let 
), = (J,1, ),2) E As, with A. not degenerate. For k EK, define <Pk: X �JR by
--- -- ---------
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Then </>k(y) has exactly one root at y=x*, where x*=E;.Jx)=E;.2(x). Further 
y<x*=></>k(y)>O and y>x*=></>k(y)<O. 
Proof : We let /1 and /2 be the density functions of A.1 and A.2, respectively. Since 
A.1= A.2, these density functions are identical, so we can write f = /1 = /2. We let g1 and 
g2·'be the density functions for Ah and A.kk. (Note that since A.1 = A.2, we have A.11 = A.22 
x x 
and A.12 =A.21. ) Let F(x) = J f(t)dt and Gi(x) = J gi(t)dt be the corresponding 
- 00 
cumulative density functions. Then, writing u' for the first derivative of u, 
</>k(y) =E;.;;, [u(x -y)] -E;.,Ju(x -y)] 
=J u(x-y)[g1(x)-g2(x)]dx 
=J u'(x-y)[G2(x)-G1(x)]dx 
(The last step follows from integration by parts.) We write tf!(x)=G2(x)-G1(x). 
Then we can write G2 and G1 as 
x 
G1(Y)= J [1 -F1(t)]f2(t)dt 
- 00 
x 
Gl (y) = J F2 (t)fi (t)dt , 
and then, using the fact that F1 = F2 = F, and /1 = /2 = f, we get 
x 
t/!(x)=G2(x)-G1(x)= J [1-2F(t)] f(t)dt . 
Now from Lemma 2, it follows that A.;ck >A.kb so G2(x)-G1 (x) �O for all x. Hence
tf!(x) is nonnegative. Next, using the symmetry of f(t) about x*, and the fact that 
F(x*) =t, it follows easily that tjJ(x) is symmetric about x*. I.e., t/!(x) = t/!(2x* -x) 
for all x EX. Finally, since l/l'(x) == [1 -2F(x)]f(x) is positive for x < x* and negative
for x* < x, it follows that t/!(x) is single peaked. Thus, we write 
</>k(y)=J u'(x-y)tf!(x)dx , (17) 
where t/! is nonnegative, symmetric and single peaked about x*, and where u'(t) = 
-u'(-t) for all t. But now we can rewrite (17) as
y •XJ 
</>k(y) = J u'(t -y) l/l(t)dt -J u'(t -y) t/!(t)dt 
00 CX) 
= - J u'(y-r)l/J(2y-r)dr-J u'(t-y) l/f(t)dt 
00 
= J u'(t-y)[l/f(2y-t)-t/!(t)]dt . 
y 
So if x* �y, then for y � t, we have 2x* -t � 2y -t � t, so using the symmetry and 
single peakedness of t/!, 
t/!(2y-t)�t/!(2x*-t)=t/!(t) . 
I 
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And if y�x*, then for y�t, we have 2y-t�t�2x*-(2y-t). So 
l/t(t)�l/t(2x*-2y+t)=l/t(2y-t) . 
In both cases, these become strict inequalities if y =!= x*, and are equalities when
y = x*, hence, since u'(t -y) < 0 for y � t, we get 
y<x*=<My)>O ,
y=x* = cPk(y)=O , 
y>x* = cPk(y) <0 
Hence, <Pk has a unique root at y=x*, as we wished to show. Q.E.D. 
4. Results
Several results follow from the lemmas of the previous sections. The first 
proposition shows that in an SREE, voter beliefs must correspond to the actual 
distribution adopted by the candidates. So A*= 1·*. Further, the equilibrium voting 
strategy for the voter is one which maximizes expected utility with respect to A*, 
conditional on the endorsement. 
Proposition 1: An SREE (A*, 1·*, b*) can be characterized by a pair (A*, b*) EA x B, 
where 1·* =A*, and (A*, b*) satisfies: 
(Vt') b*EB(A*) , 
(Ct') for all k EK, A[= ..itJ lb*) 
Further, for all rx; EN and all j EK, b( satisfies 
b((k) = j if E,i;.[u;(x)] > E,i�Ju;(x)] 
for all kEK with ..i*({sESje(s)=k})=!=O. 
Proof: That 1·* =A* follows directly from (V2) and (C1) of the definition of an 
SREE. Then (Vt') and (C1 ') are immediate consequences of the fact that')'* =A*. 
The last assertion of the proposition follows directly from Lemma 2a. Q.E.D. 
Assume now that Ak E Ak is symmetric about x* E IR, i.e., its cumulative density 
Fk: IR---+[O, 1] satisfies Fk(x* + t) + Fk(x* -t) = 1 Vt E IR. Let As� A be defined, as in
the previous section, to be the set of distributions such that if A= (A.1, A.2) EA s, then
A1 = A2 and Ak is symmetric around x* for some x* EX. 
The following theorem shows that if candidate strategies are symmetric (an 
assumption required only in Theorem 1, not in Theorem 2), then, either candidate 
strategies must be identical pure strategies, or the expected policy position must 
equal the ideal point of the median voter. 
Theorem 1: If n is odd, and (A.*, b *)EA x B characterizes an SREE, with A* EA s, then 
either 
r 
I 
I 
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(a) Jct({x})=Jcf({x})=1 for some x E X or 
(b) E;.r(x)=E;.�<(x)=y* , 
:where y* is the median of the ideal points, {Ytlixi EN}.
Proof: We show that not (a) implies (b). 
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If (a) does not hold, then .lc1 = Jc2, and neither is degenerate, hence Jc(Ek) =l= 0 for k EK.
For each ctiEN, define vi(Y) =ui(Y +yt). So ui(x) =v;(x -yt), where vi is symmetric
and single peaked about 0. Write 
¢;(y) = E;.t,[vi(x -y)] -E;.�,[vi(x -y)] 
By Lemma 3b, it follows that 
y <x* => ¢;(y) > 0 
y=x* => cPi(y) =0 
y>x*=>¢i(y)<0 
But ¢;(yt)=E;.:,[ui(x)]-E;.:,l[ ui(x)], and by Lemma 1a, it follows that
cPi(yt) > 0 => b;*(k) =k 
cPi(yt) < 0 => b;*(k) = f 
Hence 
yt<x*=>bt(k)=k and b((f)=f 
yt>x*=>b;*(k)=f and b;*(f)=k . 
Since in equilibrium, we need w(s, b*) constant for A* a. e. SES (see Lemma 1 b), it 
follows that we need x* = y;:;, where y;:; is the median of the yt. Q.E.D. 
By introducting an additional stability condition, we can narrow the class of 
admissible SREE's further. For this result, we endow Ak with the weak topology . 
.J>efinition: If(Jc *, b*) characterizes an SREE, then it is stable if, for each k EK, there
is a neighborhood N(A't) of Jct such that whenever (Jc',b') EAxB satisfies
Jc�EN(Jcn, .lc£=Jct and b'EB(Jc'), then 
Jc�(- lb')= Jc!(- lb*) . 
So an SREE is stable if and only if, whenever one candidate changes his 
distribution, and voters vote optimally (given the new distribution), the distribution 
of winning positions does not change. I.e., small errors by a candidate do not change 
his recommended best response. The following theorem shows that the only stable 
SREE occurs when both candidates adopt the median voter's ideal point with 
probability one. Thus the stable SREE results in voters and candidates behaving as 
if they had complete information. 
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Theorem 2: There exists a stable SREE. Further, if n is odd and (A*, b*)EA xB 
characterizes a stable SREE, then Af({y*}) = A!({y*}) = 1 for y* EX, where y* is a 
median ideal point of the electorate. 
Proof: Let (A*, b*) characterize a stable SREE. We note, first, from the definition of 
stability, that for any b'EB(A*), A!Clb')=A!(·lb*), so (A*,b') characterizes a 
SREE. But now, define b' E B(A *) as follows: 
b'. (k) = {b;*(k) if E,i:.(u;(x)) =l= E,itk(u;(x))' e(k) otherwise .
Clearly, b' E B(A *). Further, we have w(s, b') = e(s) for all s ES. Hence 
But, for any c E IR, 
c c 
= J (1-F2(x)) f1(x)dx+ J (1-F1(x)) f2(x)dx 
- ro - ro 
=F1(c)+F2(c)-[
_
t F2(x) f1(x)dx+ L F1(x) f2(x)dxl 
=F1 (x) + F2(c) -F1 (c)F2(c) 
= 1  -(1-F1(c))(1-F2(c))�F1(c)�F2(c) 
with strict inequality when F1 (c) =l=F2(c) or 0 < Fk(c) < 1 .  Hence Aw< A1 and Aw< A2. 
But then Aw<tA1 +tA2=A*(wlb*). Hence A*(wlb')=l=A*(wlb*), a contradiction, 
unless Af ( {y}) =A!( {y}) = 1 for some y EX. 
We must now only show that y=y*. Suppose not, assume w.l.o.g. that y<y*. 
Then for any neighborhood N(A't) of At, we picky' such that y <y' <y* and set 
A,;({y'})=1. Then if y' is chosen so that A,;EN(Aff), we have b'EB(A')=-
y+y' 
Yt < -2 - = b'(k) =k 
yt>
y�y' =b'(k)=f.
but since y�y' <y*, it follows that w(s,b')=e(s), where e(s)EK-{e(s)}. Hence
A�({y'}lb')= 1 
).!({Y}lb*)=1 
so the two are not equal, hence (A*, b*) is not stable. 
Finally, to prove existence, we let (A*, b*) EA x B satisfy At({y*}) = 1. Let N(A:) 
be any neighborhood of At, and let A,; E N(At), A{= At, and b' E B(A'). Then we must 
' 
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have, for kEK, if A.'(Ek)=l=O, 
Yt�Yi=>b;(k)=k 
yt �Yi=> b;(k)=k 
i3ut then w(s,b)=f for all SES, hence A.�({y*}) so A.'(wjb') =A.*(wjb*). 
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